Commit graph

37 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
b0a9ba13ff hardening fixes for v6.10-rc1
- loadpin: Prevent SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE=y without module decompression
   (Stephen Boyd)
 
 - ubsan: Restore dependency on ARCH_HAS_UBSAN
 
 - kunit/fortify: Fix memcmp() test to be amplitude agnostic
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Merge tag 'hardening-v6.10-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:

 - loadpin: Prevent SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE=y without module
   decompression (Stephen Boyd)

 - ubsan: Restore dependency on ARCH_HAS_UBSAN

 - kunit/fortify: Fix memcmp() test to be amplitude agnostic

* tag 'hardening-v6.10-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  kunit/fortify: Fix memcmp() test to be amplitude agnostic
  ubsan: Restore dependency on ARCH_HAS_UBSAN
  loadpin: Prevent SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE=y without module decompression
2024-05-24 08:33:44 -07:00
Stephen Boyd
ce0d73ef8d loadpin: Prevent SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE=y without module decompression
If modules are built compressed, and LoadPin is enforcing by default, we
must have in-kernel module decompression enabled (MODULE_DECOMPRESS).
Modules will fail to load without decompression built into the kernel
because they'll be blocked by LoadPin. Add a depends on clause to
prevent this combination.

Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514224839.2526112-1-swboyd@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-05-18 13:46:10 -07:00
Joel Granados
74560bb368 lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array
This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will
reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory
bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/)

Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a
sysctl table.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-04-15 15:00:00 -04:00
Paul Moore
b1a867eeb8 lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across
multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
f3b8788cde LSM: Identify modules by more than name
Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module.  Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure.  Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().

The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.

The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.

LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.

Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
Kees Cook
5f536ac6a5 LoadPin: Annotate struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest with __counted_by
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have
their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS
(for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family
functions).

As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest.
Additionally, since the element count member must be set before accessing
the annotated flexible array member, move its initialization earlier.

[1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci

Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817235955.never.762-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-08-25 16:07:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
888d3c9f7f sysctl-6.4-rc1
This pull request goes with only a few sysctl moves from the
 kernel/sysctl.c file, the rest of the work has been put towards
 deprecating two API calls which incur recursion and prevent us
 from simplifying the registration process / saving memory per
 move. Most of the changes have been soaking on linux-next since
 v6.3-rc3.
 
 I've slowed down the kernel/sysctl.c moves due to Matthew Wilcox's
 feedback that we should see if we could *save* memory with these
 moves instead of incurring more memory. We currently incur more
 memory since when we move a syctl from kernel/sysclt.c out to its
 own file we end up having to add a new empty sysctl used to register
 it. To achieve saving memory we want to allow syctls to be passed
 without requiring the end element being empty, and just have our
 registration process rely on ARRAY_SIZE(). Without this, supporting
 both styles of sysctls would make the sysctl registration pretty
 brittle, hard to read and maintain as can be seen from Meng Tang's
 efforts to do just this [0]. Fortunately, in order to use ARRAY_SIZE()
 for all sysctl registrations also implies doing the work to deprecate
 two API calls which use recursion in order to support sysctl
 declarations with subdirectories.
 
 And so during this development cycle quite a bit of effort went into
 this deprecation effort. I've annotated the following two APIs are
 deprecated and in few kernel releases we should be good to remove them:
 
   * register_sysctl_table()
   * register_sysctl_paths()
 
 During this merge window we should be able to deprecate and unexport
 register_sysctl_paths(), we can probably do that towards the end
 of this merge window.
 
 Deprecating register_sysctl_table() will take a bit more time but
 this pull request goes with a few example of how to do this.
 
 As it turns out each of the conversions to move away from either of
 these two API calls *also* saves memory. And so long term, all these
 changes *will* prove to have saved a bit of memory on boot.
 
 The way I see it then is if remove a user of one deprecated call, it
 gives us enough savings to move one kernel/sysctl.c out from the
 generic arrays as we end up with about the same amount of bytes.
 
 Since deprecating register_sysctl_table() and register_sysctl_paths()
 does not require maintainer coordination except the final unexport
 you'll see quite a bit of these changes from other pull requests, I've
 just kept the stragglers after rc3.
 
 Most of these changes have been soaking on linux-next since around rc3.
 
 [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZAD+cpbrqlc5vmry@bombadil.infradead.org
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Merge tag 'sysctl-6.4-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux

Pull sysctl updates from Luis Chamberlain:
 "This only does a few sysctl moves from the kernel/sysctl.c file, the
  rest of the work has been put towards deprecating two API calls which
  incur recursion and prevent us from simplifying the registration
  process / saving memory per move. Most of the changes have been
  soaking on linux-next since v6.3-rc3.

  I've slowed down the kernel/sysctl.c moves due to Matthew Wilcox's
  feedback that we should see if we could *save* memory with these moves
  instead of incurring more memory. We currently incur more memory since
  when we move a syctl from kernel/sysclt.c out to its own file we end
  up having to add a new empty sysctl used to register it. To achieve
  saving memory we want to allow syctls to be passed without requiring
  the end element being empty, and just have our registration process
  rely on ARRAY_SIZE(). Without this, supporting both styles of sysctls
  would make the sysctl registration pretty brittle, hard to read and
  maintain as can be seen from Meng Tang's efforts to do just this [0].
  Fortunately, in order to use ARRAY_SIZE() for all sysctl registrations
  also implies doing the work to deprecate two API calls which use
  recursion in order to support sysctl declarations with subdirectories.

  And so during this development cycle quite a bit of effort went into
  this deprecation effort. I've annotated the following two APIs are
  deprecated and in few kernel releases we should be good to remove
  them:

   - register_sysctl_table()
   - register_sysctl_paths()

  During this merge window we should be able to deprecate and unexport
  register_sysctl_paths(), we can probably do that towards the end of
  this merge window.

  Deprecating register_sysctl_table() will take a bit more time but this
  pull request goes with a few example of how to do this.

  As it turns out each of the conversions to move away from either of
  these two API calls *also* saves memory. And so long term, all these
  changes *will* prove to have saved a bit of memory on boot.

  The way I see it then is if remove a user of one deprecated call, it
  gives us enough savings to move one kernel/sysctl.c out from the
  generic arrays as we end up with about the same amount of bytes.

  Since deprecating register_sysctl_table() and register_sysctl_paths()
  does not require maintainer coordination except the final unexport
  you'll see quite a bit of these changes from other pull requests, I've
  just kept the stragglers after rc3"

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZAD+cpbrqlc5vmry@bombadil.infradead.org [0]

* tag 'sysctl-6.4-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux: (29 commits)
  fs: fix sysctls.c built
  mm: compaction: remove incorrect #ifdef checks
  mm: compaction: move compaction sysctl to its own file
  mm: memory-failure: Move memory failure sysctls to its own file
  arm: simplify two-level sysctl registration for ctl_isa_vars
  ia64: simplify one-level sysctl registration for kdump_ctl_table
  utsname: simplify one-level sysctl registration for uts_kern_table
  ntfs: simplfy one-level sysctl registration for ntfs_sysctls
  coda: simplify one-level sysctl registration for coda_table
  fs/cachefiles: simplify one-level sysctl registration for cachefiles_sysctls
  xfs: simplify two-level sysctl registration for xfs_table
  nfs: simplify two-level sysctl registration for nfs_cb_sysctls
  nfs: simplify two-level sysctl registration for nfs4_cb_sysctls
  lockd: simplify two-level sysctl registration for nlm_sysctls
  proc_sysctl: enhance documentation
  xen: simplify sysctl registration for balloon
  md: simplify sysctl registration
  hv: simplify sysctl registration
  scsi: simplify sysctl registration with register_sysctl()
  csky: simplify alignment sysctl registration
  ...
2023-04-27 16:52:33 -07:00
Luis Chamberlain
5df5bdc3c4 loadpin: simplify sysctls use with register_sysctl()
register_sysctl_paths() is not required, we can just use
register_sysctl() with the required path specified.

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2023-04-13 11:49:20 -07:00
Paul Moore
f22f9aaf6c selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality
After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality.  The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:

  The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
  runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel.  If
  disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
  the system is rebooted.

  The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
  boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
  make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
  allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
  Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
  it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
  "__ro_after_init" feature.

It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.

From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.

It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.

Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage.  In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-20 12:34:23 -04:00
Kees Cook
eba773596b LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing
For LoadPin to be used at all in a classic distro environment, it needs
to allow for switching filesystems (from the initramfs to the "real"
root filesystem). To allow for this, if the "enforce" mode is not set at
boot, reset the pinned filesystem tracking when the pinned filesystem
gets unmounted instead of invalidating further loads. Once enforcement
is set, it cannot be unset, and the pinning will stick.

This means that distros can build with CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y, but with
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE disabled, but after boot is running,
the system can enable enforcement:

  $ sysctl -w kernel.loadpin.enforced=1

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195746.1366607-4-keescook@chromium.org
2023-01-19 15:18:20 -08:00
Kees Cook
2cfaa84efc LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking
Refactor the pin reporting to be more cleanly outside the locking. It
was already, but moving it around helps clear the path for the root to
switch when not enforcing.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195746.1366607-3-keescook@chromium.org
2023-01-19 15:18:20 -08:00
Kees Cook
60ba1028fc LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization
In preparation for shifting root mount when not enforcing, split sysctl
logic out into a separate helper, and unconditionally register the
sysctl, but only make it writable when the device is writable.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195746.1366607-2-keescook@chromium.org
2023-01-19 15:18:20 -08:00
Kees Cook
b76ded2146 LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper
In preparation for allowing mounts to shift when not enforced, move
read-only checking into a separate helper.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195746.1366607-1-keescook@chromium.org
2023-01-19 15:18:20 -08:00
Kees Cook
1a17e5b513 LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks
LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether
or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly
conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will
succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header).

Fixes: 2039bda1fa ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Tested-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195453.never.494-kees@kernel.org
2022-12-14 14:34:18 -08:00
Matthias Kaehlcke
6e42aec7c7 LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header
LoadPin expects the file with trusted verity root digests to be
an ASCII file with one digest (hex value) per line. A pinned
root could contain files that meet these format requirements,
even though the hex values don't represent trusted root
digests.

Add a new requirement to the file format which consists in
the first line containing a fixed string. This prevents
attackers from feeding files with an otherwise valid format
to LoadPin.

Suggested-by: Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220906181725.1.I3f51d1bb0014e5a5951be4ad3c5ad7c7ca1dfc32@changeid
2022-09-07 16:37:27 -07:00
Matthias Kaehlcke
aafc203bba LoadPin: Fix Kconfig doc about format of file with verity digests
The doc for CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY says that the file with verity
digests must contain a comma separated list of digests. That was the case
at some stage of the development, but was changed during the review
process to one digest per line. Update the Kconfig doc accordingly.

Reported-by: Jae Hoon Kim <kimjae@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc2 ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829174557.1.I5d202d1344212a3800d9828f936df6511eb2d0d1@changeid
2022-09-07 16:37:27 -07:00
Kees Cook
6a3981af3f LoadPin: Return EFAULT on copy_from_user() failures
The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to
be copied on a failure. Such failures should return -EFAULT to high
levels.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc2 ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-08-16 12:17:18 -07:00
Matthias Kaehlcke
3f805f8cc2 LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices
Extend LoadPin to allow loading of kernel files from trusted dm-verity [1]
devices.

This change adds the concept of trusted verity devices to LoadPin. LoadPin
maintains a list of root digests of verity devices it considers trusted.
Userspace can populate this list through an ioctl on the new LoadPin
securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl receives a file descriptor of
a file with verity digests as parameter. Verity reads the digests from
this file after confirming that the file is located on the pinned root.
The digest file must contain one digest per line. The list of trusted
digests can only be set up once, which is typically done at boot time.

When a kernel file is read LoadPin first checks (as usual) whether the file
is located on the pinned root, if so the file can be loaded. Otherwise, if
the verity extension is enabled, LoadPin determines whether the file is
located on a verity backed device and whether the root digest of that
device is in the list of trusted digests. The file can be loaded if the
verity device has a trusted root digest.

Background:

As of now LoadPin restricts loading of kernel files to a single pinned
filesystem, typically the rootfs. This works for many systems, however it
can result in a bloated rootfs (and OTA updates) on platforms where
multiple boards with different hardware configurations use the same rootfs
image. Especially when 'optional' files are large it may be preferable to
download/install them only when they are actually needed by a given board.
Chrome OS uses Downloadable Content (DLC) [2] to deploy certain 'packages'
at runtime. As an example a DLC package could contain firmware for a
peripheral that is not present on all boards. DLCs use dm-verity to verify
the integrity of the DLC content.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.html
[2] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/HEAD/dlcservice/docs/developer.md

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.2.I01c67af41d2f6525c6d023101671d7339a9bc8b5@changeid
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-07-08 10:46:53 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig
ed5edd5a70 loadpin: stop using bdevname
Use the %pg format specifier to save on stack consuption and code size.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512062014.1826835-1-hch@lst.de
2022-05-16 16:02:21 -07:00
Kees Cook
2039bda1fa LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.

For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05 13:37:03 +02:00
Kees Cook
b64fcae74b LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05 13:37:03 +02:00
Scott Branden
b89999d004 fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05 13:34:18 +02:00
Christoph Hellwig
3f1266f1f8 block: move block-related definitions out of fs.h
Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable
headers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-24 09:16:02 -06:00
Matteo Croce
eec4844fae proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range.  This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

    $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
    248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

    # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
    add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
    Data                                         old     new   delta
    sysctl_vals                                    -      12     +12
    __kstrtab_sysctl_vals                          -      12     +12
    max                                           14      10      -4
    int_max                                       16       -     -16
    one                                           68       -     -68
    zero                                         128      28    -100
    Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 17:08:07 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c079512aad security/loadpin improvement
- Allow exclusion of specific file types (Ke Wu)
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Merge tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull security/loadpin updates from Kees Cook:

 - Allow exclusion of specific file types (Ke Wu)

* tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types
2019-07-11 14:42:44 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
9c92ab6191 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public
  license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and
  may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this
  program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but
  without any warranty without even the implied warranty of
  merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
  general public license for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141900.642774971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:36:37 +02:00
Ke Wu
0ff9848067 security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types
Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-05-31 13:57:40 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
ec8f24b7fa treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 10:50:46 +02:00
Kees Cook
70b62c2566 LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-08 13:18:43 -08:00
Kees Cook
13523bef1e LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-18 15:29:44 -07:00
Kees Cook
f4b626d6de LoadPin: Report friendly block device name
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-18 15:29:44 -07:00
Mimi Zohar
c77b8cdf74 module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook.  This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-16 12:31:57 -07:00
Al Viro
304ec482f5 get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-02-22 14:28:50 -05:00
James Morris
ca97d939db security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-03-06 11:00:15 +11:00
Casey Schaufler
d69dece5f5 LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-19 13:18:29 +11:00
Kees Cook
b937190c40 LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-17 20:10:30 +10:00
Kees Cook
9b091556a0 LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00