kernel-hacking-2024-linux-s.../security/tomoyo
Tetsuo Handa 4e78c724d4 TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-14 15:18:42 +10:00
..
common.c TOMOYO: Fix infinite loop bug when reading /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit 2011-04-19 09:37:12 +10:00
common.h
domain.c
file.c TOMOYO: Don't add / for allow_unmount permission check. 2011-04-19 09:37:09 +10:00
gc.c
group.c
Kconfig
load_policy.c Fix common misspellings 2011-03-31 11:26:23 -03:00
Makefile
memory.c tomoyo: fix memory leak in tomoyo_commit_ok() 2011-03-31 10:25:06 +11:00
mount.c TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl(). 2011-06-14 15:18:42 +10:00
realpath.c
securityfs_if.c
tomoyo.c
util.c TOMOYO: Fix wrong domainname validation. 2011-05-12 11:07:21 +10:00